Susan Haack and the Double-Aspect Theory of Epistemic Justification

Author
Morteza Fathizadeh
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Susan Haack’s theory of foundherentism represents an innovative attempt in contemporary epistemology to move beyond entrenched dichotomies such as foundationalism versus coherentism, reasons versus causes, and externalism versus internalism. By rejecting the reduction of epistemic justification either to infallible basic beliefs or to mere coherence among beliefs, Haack proposes an alternative model in which justification emerges from the interaction and mutual reinforcement of experiential evidence, prior beliefs, and the overall coherence of a belief system. She argues that, by drawing on the strengths of both traditional theories while avoiding their shortcomings, foundherentism offers a dynamic and gradual structure of epistemic justification that allows for the correction and revision of beliefs. Nevertheless, the theory has faced several criticisms, including doubts about its originality and theoretical independence, its inability to adequately explain the transition from non-conceptual evidence to epistemic justification, and ambiguities surrounding its claim to truth-indicativeness.
This paper adopts an analytic and critical approach to explicating the main components of foundherentism and assessing the most significant objections raised against it.
Keywords
Foundherentism
Epistemic Justification
Truth-Indicativeness
Ratification
Susan Haack
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