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Hegelian Traces in Heidegger's Thought: A Critical Examination of Influence and Ontological Redefinition¹

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Abstract

This article critically examines the significant influence of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's absolute idealism on the ontology of Martin Heidegger and explores the ways in which this influence is both preserved and transformed within Heidegger's thought. While Hegel, as a major philosopher of modernity, emphasized concepts such as freedom, rationality, consciousness, and history, Heidegger, one of modernity's most influential critics, redirected philosophical inquiry toward the questions of Being and time. Drawing on the interpretations of major Heideggerian scholars, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michel Haar, Dominique Janicaud, and David Kolb, this study argues that Heideggerian key concepts, especially historicity and dialectic, retain unmistakable Hegelian traces. At the same time, the paper demonstrates Heidegger's deliberate effort to reinterpret and reshape these inherited concepts within the framework of his own ontological project. The article further examines both the convergences and divergences between Hegel and Heidegger in relation to history, phenomenology, and modernity. It concludes that although the parallels between the two philosophers, particularly in Heidegger's later thought,

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suggest a neo-Hegelian tendency, Heidegger ultimately moves beyond the Hegelian framework. This becomes especially evident in his understanding of the origin and completion of metaphysics, where he critically confronts and attempts to overcome Hegel's philosophical system.

Keywords: Heidegger, Hegel, Historicity, Phenomenology, Modernity, Dialectics.

1. Introduction

As both an heir to the philosophical tradition and one of the foundational thinkers of modernity, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel exerted a profound influence on later intellectual movements. Post-Hegelian philosophy is generally divided, both historically and conceptually, into two broad currents: the "classical nineteenth-century neo-Hegelians," which include the Right, Left, and Center Hegelians as well as the British, American, Italian, and French schools; and the "later twentieth-century neo-Hegelians," encompassing post-structuralist, hermeneutic, and radical approaches.

Martin Heidegger, as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, occupies a distinctive position between these two traditions through his radical critique of what he called the "metaphysics of presence." The relationship between Heidegger and his philosophical predecessors, especially Hegel, has therefore remained a central subject of debate among scholars and commentators. Examining the nature and extent of this relationship can provide a deeper understanding of both Hegel, as a central thinker of modernity, and Heidegger, as one of its most powerful critics. Hegel, through his comprehensive philosophical system, sought to advance the history of philosophy by means of dialectics. As a philosopher of modernity, he placed freedom, rationality, and progress at the center of his thought. Heidegger, by contrast, attempted to rethink the history of philosophy through a radical critique of modernity and its conceptual foundations. His focus shifted toward Being, time, and ontology, introducing a fundamentally new approach to philosophical inquiry. In works such as *Being and Time*, Heidegger refers both directly and indirectly to Hegel. His treatment of time and historicity, in particular, reveals a deep engagement with Hegelian philosophy, as Heidegger attempts to reinterpret dialectic within the framework of his own ontology in order to achieve a more original understanding of Being.

This study adopts an analytical-critical approach based on library research in order to examine the similarities and differences between the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. It focuses especially on the themes of history,

phenomenology, and modernity through an analysis of the interpretations offered by major Heideggerian scholars and commentators, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michel Haar, Dominique Janicaud, and David Kolb, whose works represent different intellectual traditions in Germany, France, and the United States. Given the substantial affinities between Hegel and Heidegger, the article argues that Heidegger, particularly in his later writings, may plausibly be understood as a neo-Hegelian thinker.

The importance of this discussion extends beyond the history of Western philosophy. For Eastern societies, and especially Islamic societies, that continue to grapple with the challenge of reconciling their own traditions with European modernity, such a comparative inquiry carries particular significance. Accordingly, this article examines the epistemological, ontological, anthropological, axiological, and historical foundations of both philosophers by drawing on the interpretations of the commentators mentioned above.

Within the broader history of Western philosophy, however, few scholars would describe Heidegger as merely an imitator of Hegel or simply another neo-Hegelian. Heidegger explicitly criticized Hegelian metaphysics and positioned his own philosophical project in opposition to the Western metaphysical tradition. Given the substantial differences between Hegel and Heidegger regarding issues such as the dialectic of Spirit, the rationality of reality, and the teleological structure of knowledge, it is difficult to defend the claim that Heidegger simply reproduced Hegelian philosophy. Nevertheless, significant similarities between the two thinkers cannot be denied. These similarities suggest that Heidegger was never able to detach himself entirely from the powerful metaphysical tradition that culminated, in the modern period, in Hegel's system. Even if indirectly or unconsciously, Heidegger remained deeply engaged with that tradition.

To address these questions, the following discussion turns to the interpretations of major Heideggerian commentators, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michel Haar, Dominique Janicaud, and David Kolb. Before proceeding, however, an important methodological point should be emphasized. In comparing major philosophical thinkers, especially at the deepest levels of philosophical reflection, one should not expect merely superficial or explicit similarities.

Great philosophical systems resemble continents: their deepest connections often lie beneath the visible surface of thought. If the similarities between Hegel and Heidegger were as obvious as those between René Descartes and

Baruch Spinoza, or between John Locke and George Berkeley, their relationship would already be self-evident and would require little further investigation.

2. Hans-Georg Gadamer

Gadamer, a German philosopher and direct student of Heidegger, regarded Heidegger as a thinker deeply shaped by Hegel, much like the Young Hegelians and later Neo-Kantian critics of Hegel, including Ludwig Feuerbach, Søren Kierkegaard, Edmund Husserl, and Karl Jaspers. To support this interpretation, Gadamer advances three principal arguments.

2.1. Heidegger's Incomplete Critique of Hegel

Gadamer argues that Heidegger's critique of idealism, particularly his criticism of consciousness-centered philosophy and Hegel's philosophy of Spirit, belongs mainly to Heidegger's early period and ultimately remains incomplete. He offers two reasons for this claim. First, after the *Kehre* ("turn"), Heidegger gradually abandoned the transcendental conception of the human self or selfhood that had initially distinguished his thought from Hegelian philosophy. Second, Heidegger's interpretation of *Dasein* as the starting point for the question of Being bears a significant resemblance to Hegel's account of the dialectic of Spirit. According to Gadamer, Hegel had already moved beyond merely subjective consciousness and self-consciousness by elevating Spirit into a broader historical and ontological process. For this reason, Heidegger's later departure from his earlier understanding of *Dasein*, as the foundational point of ontology appears, in Gadamer's interpretation, fundamentally close to Hegel's philosophical project (Gadamer, 1976, pp. 102–104).

2.2. Historical Perspective

According to Gadamer, Hegel unified nature and history under the comprehensive concept of Logos, demonstrating that reason could be discovered within history itself, beyond apparent contradictions and conflicts. What had previously been attributed to divine providence because of the limits of human understanding was transformed, through Hegel's philosophy, into something intelligible and historically comprehensible. By incorporating history into the very structure of philosophical inquiry, Heidegger moved closer to this Hegelian orientation. Yet Heidegger interpreted the role of Logos in Western thought in a radically different way. In his view, the history of philosophy, from Plato to Hegel, is marked by an increasing "forgetting of Being." At the same time, Gadamer stresses an important distinction between the two thinkers. Heidegger did not accept the

notion of historical necessity in the Hegelian sense. For Heidegger, the “sending” or “destining” of Being unfolds beyond the complete reach of human self-consciousness or rational mastery. Nevertheless, Gadamer suggests that Heidegger’s account of the history of metaphysics still contains a kind of concealed necessity, expressed through the historical “sending of Being,” which shapes both the present and the future (Gadamer, 1976, pp 104–105).

2.3. Emphasis on Language

In *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer examines the relationship between language and truth through a comparison of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Martin Heidegger. According to Gadamer, both philosophers regard language as the fundamental medium through which truth is disclosed. For Hegel, language functions as the medium through which absolute reason realizes itself within the dialectical movement of history. Heidegger, by contrast, describes language as the “house of Being,” the site in which truth (*aletheia*) reveals itself. Although both thinkers emphasize the historicity of truth and the dependence of human understanding on language, they differ significantly regarding the end of history (Gadamer, 2004, p 435). Hegel envisions a final rational totality, whereas Heidegger understands truth as an open-ended and ongoing process. Drawing on both perspectives, Gadamer accepts the historicity of understanding emphasized by Hegel while, under Heidegger’s influence, interpreting language as the ontological condition for the possibility of understanding itself. Consequently, he views truth as something that emerges through dialogue and linguistic tradition (Gadamer, 2004, p 445).

3. Michel Haar

Michel Haar, a prominent French philosopher, made a significant contribution to contemporary philosophy through his rigorous analyses of Heidegger’s thought, especially regarding Dasein, ontology, anthropology, and technology. His work frequently explored the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and other intellectual traditions such as existentialism and phenomenology. In this section, Haar’s interpretation of the relationship between Hegelian and Heideggerian philosophy will be examined, particularly through the lens of history (Haar, 1999, pp 46–47).

3.1. The Fatedness of History

Haar identifies important similarities between Hegel and Heidegger in their understanding of the “fatedness” of history. In both philosophies, humanity

throughout history remains under the dominion of an “other”: in Hegel, the Absolute Spirit; in Heidegger, the destiny or sending of Being.

Heidegger himself remarks concerning Hegel: “He is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought” (Heidegger, 2002, p 243). Elsewhere he writes: “Hegel is right when, in thinking about the nature of thinking, he does so through dialogue with the history of earlier thought. He was the first who could and had to think in this way” (Ibid., pp 243–244). According to Heidegger, Hegel’s unique position lies in his understanding of the history of philosophy as an organic and unified whole rather than a collection of isolated doctrines. In this respect, Heidegger’s concepts of “Being-in-the-world” and participation in the self-disclosure of Being display notable affinities with Hegel’s conception of the historical unfolding of Spirit.

3.2. The Primacy of Historical Thinking

According to Haar, authentic thinking for both philosophers involves an inward appropriation of the genuine past. Just as Heidegger identifies the history of Being with Being itself, Hegel similarly maintains the identity of “essence” with “having-been” (Heidegger, 1982, p 199). By distinguishing between *Historisches* and *Geschichte*, Hegel differentiates authentic history from mere historical narration. Authentic history, for him, is not a linear record of completed events. Rather, history is a living and dynamic reality that encompasses past, present, and future simultaneously. The past achieves fulfillment in the present while remaining open to the future; it constitutes the enduring life of Spirit itself. In this sense, Hegelian history can be understood as the historical manifestation of Spirit (Haar, 1999, pp 46–47). Heidegger likewise adopts a qualitative understanding of time. For him, the future consists of Dasein’s existential possibilities, which become actualized through choice and subsequently enter the dimensions of present and past. Authentic Being, or “having-been”, is therefore neither merely past nor simply present or future, but an ongoing mode of realization (Heidegger, 2002, pp 240–241). The present signifies the presence of Dasein itself.

Unlike Hegel, however, Heidegger argues that Being is not the product of history but rather its primordial ground. What governs history and calls forth the future is the necessity of the origin. The primordial “sending” (*Geschick*) of Being shapes the entire metaphysical tradition beginning with the Greek experience of *aletheia*. As Heidegger states: “The origin never perishes; it never becomes past” (Heidegger, 1991, p 388). Authentic history therefore consists in the unfolding of a primordial past that continually returns.

For Heidegger, history is a process of sending that preserves fidelity to an original disclosure and its successive transformations. Drawing on biblical language, he emphasizes that only the transformation of the original beginning can become genuinely new. History is thus the ceaseless emergence of what has already been disclosed in essence.

Haar argues that the necessity governing Heidegger's notion of "sending" is even more rigorous than Hegelian rational necessity. Just as Hegel conceives history as complete both at its origin and culmination, Heidegger likewise treats Being as a self-identical process in which what occurs has, in some sense, already been gathered within Being itself: "What has been is what occurs, and what occurs has already been" (Ibid). According to Haar, this self-enclosed structure of history represents a new form of Hegelianism (Ibid., p 48). He maintains that Heidegger develops the Hölderlinian notion of origin in a distinctly Hegelian manner. The origin persists throughout the entire history of Being and remains active within all subsequent developments rather than disappearing as a mere starting point (Ibid, p 487). From this perspective, Heidegger's notion of origin resembles Hegel's "indeterminate Being": both are initially concealed yet preserved throughout the historical process. The past, understood as "having-been," governs the future, and the later Heidegger increasingly distances himself from the future-oriented emphasis of *Being and Time*. In his later thought, the future becomes a return of what has already been. Thinking itself becomes a recollection of this primordial past (Haar, 1999, pp 46–49). This point reveals another important parallel between Heidegger and Hegel. In Heidegger, recollection, the act of recalling the history of Being, is ultimately the work of Being itself rather than an autonomous human activity: "Recollection helps thought remember the truth of Being" (Heidegger, 1991, p 481). This resembles Hegel's understanding of Spirit, which employs humanity as the medium for its own historical self-realization. Likewise, in Heidegger, Being selects humanity as the site of its disclosure. Human beings can recognize their own possibilities only by responding thoughtfully to the sending of Being (Ibid, p 50).

3.3. The Evolutionary Nature of History

Another important similarity between Hegel and Heidegger lies in their conception of history as a gradual and necessary unfolding. Heidegger's distinction between "the historical" (*Historisches*) and "historiography" (*Geschichtliches*) closely parallels Hegel's distinction between genuine history and the mere narration of historical events. This raises an important

question: does Heidegger's account of history, grounded in Being, ultimately remain within the broader Hegelian, and even Platonic, tradition? If history in Heidegger is governed neither by rationality nor by chance, but by the "sending" (*Geschick*) of Being, then the affinity between his position and Hegel's philosophy of historical necessity becomes increasingly apparent. For Heidegger, the history of Being unfolds systematically while maintaining an underlying unity and totality: "This unity of the single entity in the history of Being shows itself in different forms, forms whose differences arise from the essence of disclosure and unconcealment" (Heidegger, 1991, p 420). Heidegger therefore attributes an inner necessity and teleological structure to the history of Being. Its unfolding progresses irresistibly toward the completion of metaphysics. Just as historical development in Hegel is governed by the realization of Absolute Spirit, Heidegger likewise interprets history in terms of an end that determines its movement in advance, namely, the culmination of metaphysics in the modern age. In this respect, Heidegger's account resembles the structure of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where each stage of consciousness is defined by what it has "not yet" become. Similarly, Heidegger's history of Being culminates in the stage of the "will to will," which gathers and orders all preceding stages. Haar further argues that, unlike Nietzsche's conception of the "will to power," Hegelian metaphysics does not yet present will as "will to will." Consequently, in Hegel's metaphysics of Spirit, metaphysics has not yet reached its final consummation.

3.4. Emphasis on Language

In *Truth and Method*, Hans-Georg Gadamer examines the relationship between language and truth through the philosophies of both Hegel and Heidegger. He argues that, for both thinkers, language serves as the fundamental medium through which truth becomes manifest. Hegel understood language as the instrument through which absolute reason realizes itself within the dialectical movement of history. Heidegger, by contrast, described language as the "house of Being," the site where truth (*aletheia*) discloses itself. Although both philosophers emphasize the historicity of truth and the dependence of human understanding on language, they differ significantly in their understanding of history's culmination (Gadamer, 2004, p 435). Hegel believed in the eventual realization of a rational totality, whereas Heidegger regarded truth as an open-ended and never-completed process.

Drawing together these two perspectives, Gadamer accepts the Hegelian insight into the historicity of understanding while, under Heidegger's influence, interpreting language as the ontological condition for the possibility of all understanding. Truth, therefore, is realized through dialogue and participation in a living linguistic tradition (Gadamer, 2004, p 445).

4. Michel Haar

Michel Haar, a prominent French philosopher, made important contributions to contemporary philosophy through his rigorous analyses of Heidegger's thought, especially regarding Dasein, ontology, anthropology, and technology. Much of his work focused on Heidegger's relation to intellectual movements such as existentialism and phenomenology. In this section, Haar's interpretation of the relationship between Hegelian and Heideggerian philosophy will be examined, particularly from the standpoint of his historical approach (Haar, 1999, pp 46–47).

4.1. The Fatedness of History

Haar identifies important similarities between Hegel and Heidegger in their understanding of the "fatedness of history." In both philosophies, humanity remains throughout history under the dominance of an "other", whether the Hegelian Absolute Spirit or the Heideggerian disclosure of Being. Heidegger himself remarked concerning Hegel: "He is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought" (Heidegger, 2002, p 243). Elsewhere, he writes: "Hegel is right when, in thinking about the nature of thinking, he does so through dialogue with the history of earlier thought. He was the first who could and had to think in this way" (Ibid, pp 243–244). According to Heidegger, Hegel's privileged position derives from the fact that he conceived the history of philosophy as an organic totality rather than merely reflecting on isolated predecessors. In this respect, Heidegger's concepts of "Being-in-the-world" and participation in the self-disclosure of Being bear a notable resemblance to Hegel's understanding of the historical unfolding of Spirit.

4.2. The Primacy of Historical Thinking

According to Haar, authentic thinking for both Hegel and Heidegger involves an appropriation of the genuine past. Just as Heidegger interprets the history of Being as Being itself, Hegel likewise identifies essence with "having been" (Heidegger, 1982, p 199). By distinguishing between *Historisches* and *Geschichte*, Hegel differentiates authentic history from merely external or pseudo-history. Authentic history, for him, is not a linear account of completed events. Rather, history is a dynamic and living process that

encompasses past, present, and future together. The past reaches fulfillment in the present while remaining open to the future; it constitutes the enduring life of Spirit itself. Hegelian history can therefore be understood as the historical manifestation of Spirit (Haar, 1999, pp 46–47). Heidegger similarly adopts a qualitative understanding of time. For him, the future represents the existential possibilities of Dasein, which through choice become present and then past. Authentic Being, or “having been”, cannot be reduced to past, present, or future alone; rather, it is a continuous process of coming-into-presence (Heidegger, 2002, pp 240–241). Unlike Hegel, however, Heidegger does not regard Being as the product of history. Instead, Being precedes history as its primordial source. What governs history is the necessity of origin: the primordial sending (*Geschick*) of Being shapes the entire philosophical tradition. Heidegger therefore insists that “the origin never perishes; it never becomes past” (Heidegger, 1991, p 388). Authentic history consists in a future grounded in a primordial past, with primordial Being functioning as the source of historical unfolding. For Heidegger, history is a “sending” that unfolds from an original disclosure toward successive epochs. Citing biblical motifs, he emphasizes that renewal occurs only through transformation of the original beginning. History thus becomes the ongoing emergence of a previously disclosed essence. The necessity embedded in Heidegger’s notion of sending is, according to Haar, even more rigorous than Hegelian rational necessity. Just as Hegel regards history as complete in both its beginning and its culmination, Heidegger similarly conceives Being as a self-identical process in which “what has been is what occurs, and what occurs has already been” (Ibid, p 388).

Haar interprets this self-contained conception of history as a new form of Hegelianism (Ibid, p 48). In his view, Heidegger deepens the Hölderlinian notion of origin in a distinctly Hegelian direction. The origin remains present throughout the history of Being rather than disappearing as a mere starting point. From this perspective, Heidegger’s origin resembles Hegel’s “indeterminate Being”: forgotten, yet preserved throughout the historical process. The past, understood as “having been,” governs the future, and the later Heidegger distances himself from the future-oriented emphasis of *Being and Time*. The future now appears as a returning past, while thinking itself becomes a recollection of this primordial origin (Haar, 1999, pp 46–49).

Further parallels between Hegel and Heidegger emerge at this point. “Recollection,” which recalls the history of Being, is not primarily a human activity but the work of Being itself: “Recollection helps thought remember

the truth of Being” (Heidegger, 1991, p 481). This resembles Hegel’s understanding of Spirit, which subordinates humanity to its own historical unfolding in order to achieve self-knowledge. Likewise, Heidegger sees humanity as chosen by Being to witness its disclosure. Human beings can recognize the necessity of Being’s sending and discover their possibilities only within that historical framework (Ibid, p 50).

4.3. The Evolutionary Character of History

Another important point of convergence between Hegel and Heidegger lies in their conception of the necessary unfolding of history. Heidegger’s distinction between “the historical” (*Historisches*) and “the historiographical” (*Geschichtliches*) closely parallels Hegel’s distinction between genuine history and the mere narration of historical events. This raises an important question: does Heidegger’s account of history grounded in Being remain within the broader Hegelian, and even Platonic, tradition?

If, as Heidegger claims, history is governed neither by reason nor by chance but by the “sending” (*Geschick*) of Being, then its affinity with the Hegelian system becomes evident. Hegel’s emphasis on historical necessity provides a framework analogous to Heidegger’s succession of epochs of Being. For Heidegger, the history of Being unfolds systematically while maintaining an underlying unity and totality: “This unity of the single entity in the history of Being shows itself in different forms, forms whose differences arise from the essence of disclosure and unconcealment” (Heidegger, 1991, p 420).

Heidegger therefore attributes an intrinsic necessity to the unfolding of Being, believing that its disclosure follows a teleological movement toward completion. In this respect, Heidegger’s thought parallels Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit. Just as the progress of history in Hegel is guided by the realization of Absolute Spirit, Heidegger’s understanding of historical development is governed by the end toward which metaphysics moves. In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, each stage of consciousness is defined by what it has “not yet” become; similarly, in Heidegger’s account, all historical epochs culminate in the metaphysical stage of the “will to will,” which gathers and orders all previous stages.

Haar further argues that Hegelian metaphysics differs from Nietzsche’s philosophy of the “will to power” because, in Hegel, will has not yet become “will to will.” Consequently, metaphysics in Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit has not yet reached its ultimate completion.

4.4. Phenomenological Method

Janicaud argues that despite the many differences between Heidegger and Hegel, their deepest and perhaps most concealed point of convergence lies in their phenomenological method. In his lectures on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Heidegger warned his students that Hegelian phenomenology is fundamentally incompatible with Husserlian phenomenology. For Hegel, unlike Husserl, Spirit is not simply the object of phenomenology. Rather, phenomenology itself is the path through which Spirit unfolds and manifests itself. It is not merely one possible method among others, but "the path in which Spirit itself exists, and it is the authentic and complete appearance of Spirit" (Heidegger, 1988b, p 24). Consequently, phenomenology becomes "the science of the experience of consciousness" and, in Heidegger's words, "the self-presentation of reason" (*der Selbstdarstellung der Vernunft*) (Ibid, pp 30, 41). For Janicaud, Heidegger's emphasis on "self-presentation" (*Selbstdarstellung*) provides a crucial clue for understanding the relationship between Heidegger and Hegel. The term *Darstellung* ("presentation" or "display") points to the showing of a phenomenon. In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the movement of consciousness is not deductively constructed but rather shown as it unfolds. Heidegger similarly defines phenomenology as the "presentation" of phenomenal knowledge (Heidegger, 1970, p 85). This understanding of presentation closely parallels the phenomenological method outlined by Heidegger in *Being and Time*. The language Heidegger employs there is strikingly similar to the terminology he used in describing Hegelian phenomenology in contrast to Husserlian phenomenology: "The term 'phenomenology' primarily denotes a methodological concept. This word does not describe the 'whatness' of the objects of philosophical research as topics, but rather specifies the 'how' of this research" (Heidegger, 1988a, p 27).ⁿAt first glance, the meaning of "phenomenon" may appear radically different in Hegel and Heidegger. For Hegel, the phenomenon concerns the unfolding of rational consciousness, whereas for Heidegger the phenomenon centers on Dasein. Yet a closer examination reveals a deeper affinity between them. Heidegger explains that, for Hegel, "to be a phenomenon means to emerge in such a way that what shows itself is other than what had previously shown itself. Thus, what newly appears stands opposed to what appeared before, reducing the earlier appearance to mere semblance" (Heidegger, 1988b, p 24). Likewise, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines phenomenon as "that which shows itself in itself," while distinguishing it from

“semblance” (*Schein*) and “appearance” (*Erscheinung*). Both semblance and appearance are grounded in the phenomenon itself. A phenomenon therefore involves a process in which what appears transforms itself beyond previous manifestations of the “thing itself.” From this perspective, Janicaud identifies a profound structural similarity between the two philosophers. Hegel’s central concern is the movement from consciousness to self-consciousness, reason, and ultimately the Absolute. Heidegger’s project, similarly, revolves around Dasein’s self-disclosure and the unfolding of its authentic understanding of Being (Janicaud, 1999, p 42).

4.5. Ontology

Janicaud also observes a close affinity between Heidegger and Hegel at the ontological level. In his lectures on *Phenomenology of Spirit* and in his discussion of “the concept of experience in Hegel,” Heidegger repeatedly argues that Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, and indeed the *Logic* itself, attempts to gather together the Being of beings. Absolute knowledge thus becomes equivalent to “Being-God-Knowledge” (*Sein-Gott-Wissen*). Heidegger later deepens this insight in his account of the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. At the same time, the central problem announced at the beginning of *Being and Time* is the repetition of the question concerning the meaning of Being. Heidegger explicitly links this question to the Greek philosophical tradition and to Hegel when he writes: “Their findings (Plato and Aristotle) survived through many distortions and embellishments until they reached Hegel’s ‘Logic’”. According to Janicaud, both Heidegger and Hegel therefore confront the same fundamental question of Being, although Heidegger transforms the method and orientation of this inquiry in a radically new way. What remains central in both thinkers is ontology itself, the attempt to think Being through the challenge first posed by the Greeks. From this perspective, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Heidegger’s *Being and Time* can be understood as sharing a common ontological horizon. Hegel’s work is the science of the experience of consciousness, while Heidegger’s phenomenology investigates the disclosure of Being through Dasein. Although Heidegger ultimately distances himself from Hegel, Janicaud argues that their intellectual proximity becomes unmistakable when Hegel’s phenomenology is interpreted ontologically.

An ontological reading of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* can therefore converge at important points with *Being and Time*, especially when Heideggerian phenomenology is understood in a broader Hegelian sense. Even though *Being and Time* lacks the dialectical ascent characteristic of Hegel,

Heidegger's critique of "everydayness" and his analysis of *das Man* function in a way analogous to Hegel's critique of "natural consciousness" and its immediate certainties. Just as consciousness in Hegel must move beyond its limited perspectives toward absolute knowing, Dasein in Heidegger must move beyond everyday inauthenticity toward authentic existence. Although Being, like the Absolute, is always already near to us through our pre-ontological understanding, its truth can only be genuinely disclosed through "care" (*Sorge*) and appropriated through "resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*). Dasein, much like Hegelian consciousness, must therefore traverse a path toward the realization of its authentic possibilities (Janicaud, 1999, p 43).

5. David Kolb

David Kolb was an American philosopher whose work focused on Continental philosophy, especially the thought of Hegel, Heidegger, postmodernism, and the relationship between philosophy, technology, tradition, and modernity. In *The Critique of Pure Modernity*, he extensively analyzes the similarities between Hegel and Heidegger through the lens of modernity (Kolb, 1988, pp 213–214). At the same time, Kolb emphasizes that Heidegger both inherits and critiques important dimensions of Hegelian thought. His interpretation primarily revolves around the themes of modernity and subjectivity.

5.1. Understanding Modernity

According to Kolb, both Hegel and Heidegger understand modernity as beginning with the Reformation and culminating in the contemporary world. Heidegger believed that Hegel interpreted modernity through concepts such as rationalization, liberalism, bourgeois society, economic development, scientific progress, and the realization of a rational state. Kolb argues that Heidegger's own account of modernity includes many of these same characteristics, although Heidegger interprets them through the broader framework of global technology and technological domination. Despite this shared perspective, Heidegger levels a decisive critique against Hegel. From Heidegger's standpoint, Hegel ultimately failed to grasp the true essence of modernity and technology, even though he identified many of their outward signs. Hegel's metaphor of the "Owl of Minerva" suggests that philosophy arrives only after historical events have unfolded, retrospectively comprehending and rationally organizing them. Heidegger, by contrast, seeks to think what has remained unthought and to hear what has remained unsaid, especially the concealed "event" (*Ereignis*) underlying the modern world. Heidegger attributes Hegel's limitation to the fact that Hegel himself

remained within the *Geschick* (destining) of metaphysics. Hegel continued to think truth as correspondence and Being as presence, and therefore could not fully experience the withdrawal and self-concealment involved in the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*). For Heidegger, Hegel's philosophy still rests upon a conception of Being grounded in human subjectivity and self-certainty. Hegel therefore remains unable to confront humanity's deeper finitude. Whereas Hegel sought a rational social order compatible with modern freedom, Heidegger attempted to move beyond human self-subjectivity altogether. From Heidegger's perspective, Hegel's philosophy represents an early and decisive stage in the emergence of technological domination.

5.2. The Unity and Coherence of Modernity

Kolb further argues that both Hegel and Heidegger view modernity not as a fragmented collection of separate developments in politics, economics, science, and art, but as a unified historical event. What appear to be distinct transformations are, for both thinkers, manifestations of a deeper and coherent historical process. For Hegel, this unity reflects the self-development of Absolute Spirit through the dialectical progression of history, in which contradictions are ultimately reconciled within a higher synthesis. Heidegger similarly interprets modernity as grounded in a unified understanding of Being. Through the concept of *Gestell* ("enframing"), he describes modernity as the dominance of a particular mode of revealing that shapes every dimension of contemporary life.

5.3. The Realization of Western Aspirations

Kolb also notes that both philosophers agree that modernity represents the realization of many aspirations embedded within the Western tradition. Nevertheless, humanity has still not reached its most fundamental mode of existence. The difference lies in their evaluation of this condition. Hegel maintains an ultimately optimistic view: the deficiencies of modernity belong only to an incomplete stage that will eventually be overcome through a higher reconciliation of freedom and social unity. The final stage of modernity preserves the achievements of modern freedom while reintegrating certain dimensions of traditional ethical life. Heidegger, however, interprets modernity as the continuation of the West's forgetting of humanity's primordial relation to the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*). Although the final stage of modernity may open a path toward a renewed encounter with Being, Heidegger does not believe this necessarily

inaugurates a new historical epoch. Rather, it merely mitigates the destructive consequences of technological domination.

5.4. Subjectivity

For both Hegel and Heidegger, one of the defining characteristics of modernity is the self-grounding nature of the human subject. Modern humanity understands itself as autonomous and self-determining, asserting itself over the contents of life and demonstrating its freedom through its capacity to transcend and organize the world according to its own aims. In this process, the world becomes something represented, appropriated, and controlled by the knowing subject. Both philosophers therefore associate modern self-certainty with a form of human self-objectification. Nevertheless, they differ significantly in how they interpret this condition.

First, Hegel regards the movement of history as a progression toward the realization of individual freedom. For this reason, individualism becomes an essential feature of modernity and of the self-grounding subject. This development ultimately finds fulfillment in the rational state, where personal freedom is reconciled with the larger movement of Spirit. Heidegger, by contrast, does not consider bourgeois individualism to be the necessary culmination of history. Rather, he views it as only one historical possibility opened by the essence of the modern age. Second, Heidegger places far greater emphasis than Hegel on the dominating and leveling tendencies of modernity. He associates modern existence with the will to power and with the reduction of beings into resources available for calculation, storage, and exploitation. Although traces of this critique can also be found in Hegel's discussion of modern consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel generally emphasizes themes such as citizenship, freedom, and the inner complexities of modern selfhood, including irony and narcissism. Moreover, Hegel devoted comparatively little attention to technology and the role of the will in shaping the modern world. Heidegger therefore argues that Hegel failed to fully grasp the essence of modernity, since even Hegel's proposed resolution to modern alienation ultimately remains within the framework of human self-assertion and subjective will.

5.5. Cyclical or Linear Evolution

Although both Hegel and Heidegger criticize the modern belief in endless linear progress, they nonetheless conceive history as a dynamic movement unfolding within a broader historical structure. Hegel understands history as a dialectical and progressive process through which Spirit gradually attains self-consciousness and freedom. History advances by reinterpreting and

overcoming previous stages, producing a movement that is cyclical in form yet progressive in direction. Heidegger, however, interprets history through the concept of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*). For him, history is not a linear progression toward a final goal, but a non-linear unfolding in which human beings are always situated within a historically given horizon. The cyclical character of history in Heidegger's thought is therefore not directed toward progress, but toward a return to origins and the retrieval of forgotten possibilities of Being.

According to David Kolb, Heidegger's critique of Hegelian metaphysics nevertheless continues to preserve certain dialectical structures. Even while attempting to move beyond Hegel, Heidegger reconstructs aspects of dialectical thinking within a non-metaphysical framework. Like Hegel, Heidegger sees history as a dynamic movement, though not one governed by linear development. Instead, it consists in the alternating disclosure and concealment of the truth of Being (*aletheia*), a process that retains a tension resembling dialectic.

Both philosophers also connect freedom to history, though in different ways. For Hegel, freedom emerges as the historical realization of Spirit. For Heidegger, freedom means openness to Being and responsiveness to its disclosure. Kolb therefore suggests that Heidegger's project of overcoming metaphysics parallels Hegel's notion of the end of history, since both thinkers seek to uncover the fundamental structure underlying historical development. Consequently, despite Heidegger's critique of Hegel, traces of the Hegelian tradition remain deeply embedded in his thought.

5.6. The Involuntary Nature of Subjectivity

Both Hegel and Heidegger maintain that the self-grounding character of modern humanity does not arise simply from individual choice or subjective intention. Rather, it emerges from larger historical and ontological processes, whether the unfolding of Hegelian Spirit or Heidegger's event of appropriation (*Ereignis*). Although the two philosophers approach this issue differently, their views reveal important similarities as well as decisive differences.

6. Points of Similarity

First, both philosophers emphasize the determining role of history and historical context. For Hegel, subjectivity develops within the dialectical movement of history. Self-consciousness gradually emerges through interaction with the world and with others, and this development is shaped by historical conditions that transcend individual control. Similarly,

Heidegger argues that Dasein is always situated within a historical world. Human existence is fundamentally historical, and our understanding of ourselves and the world is inevitably shaped by conditions into which we are already thrown. Second, both thinkers regard involuntariness as a constitutive aspect of human existence. In Hegel's philosophy, individuals participate in the unfolding of Spirit within a rational historical process that exceeds their personal intentions. Human beings move toward freedom, but within a structure not fully determined by conscious will. Heidegger expresses a similar idea through the concept of *Geworfenheit* (thrownness). Human beings always find themselves within a pre-existing world shaped by language, culture, and history, conditions they did not choose but must nonetheless confront. In both philosophies, freedom does not consist in escaping these conditions, but in consciously responding to them.

7. Points of Divergence

Despite these similarities, important differences remain. First, Hegel locates the source of involuntariness in the dialectical unfolding of Spirit throughout history. The individual becomes self-conscious through participation in a rational historical process guided by forces larger than the self. Heidegger, however, roots involuntariness in the existential structure of thrownness. Human beings are placed within an already existing world and must respond to conditions that precede them. Second, the two philosophers differ in their understanding of freedom. For Hegel, involuntariness ultimately serves the realization of freedom and absolute self-consciousness. It represents a stage within the dialectical movement toward rational freedom. Heidegger, by contrast, shifts the emphasis away from freedom as historical fulfillment and toward authenticity. What matters is not the achievement of absolute freedom, but the individual's capacity to confront and assume responsibility for its own Being. Third, Hegel views self-consciousness as progressively unfolding toward completion within the dialectical movement of history. Heidegger, however, maintains that Dasein's self-understanding always remains conditioned by historicity and existential limitation. Authenticity therefore requires acknowledging these limitations rather than overcoming them entirely.

8. Greece: The Origin of Modernity

According to Kolb, both Hegel and Heidegger regard modernity as the continuation of a process that began in ancient Greece. For Hegel, Greek civilization initiated the movement from an organic communal life toward individuality and self-consciousness. He traces this transition from the

unified world of Homeric culture to the tensions and fragmentation visible in the age of Socrates and Plato, particularly in Greek tragedy and sophistic thought. Modernity represents the culmination of this historical development. Heidegger, however, argues that his interpretation of the Greeks reaches a deeper level than Hegel's. In Heidegger's view, the Greek beginning established the understanding of Being as presence and initiated the metaphysical search for ultimate foundations. He contends that Hegel overlooked the most decisive transformation within Greek thought: the transformation of truth from unconcealment (*aletheia*) into correctness or correspondence. In his essay "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," Heidegger argues that Plato redefined truth in terms of the agreement between thought and reality, both understood as constantly present entities. What was forgotten in this transformation was the more primordial meaning of truth as unconcealment, a finite and historical openness to Being that had characterized pre-Socratic thought. According to Heidegger, this forgotten understanding of *aletheia* lies at the origin of the metaphysical tradition that ultimately culminates in modernity.

9. Conclusion: Heidegger's Complex Relationship with Hegel

This article has examined the complex relationship between Hegel's philosophy and Heidegger's thought by focusing on Heidegger's critical appropriation and transformation of Hegelian concepts. Drawing upon the interpretations of Gadamer, Haar, Janicaud, and Kolb, the study has shown that Heidegger was deeply influenced by Hegel in fundamental areas such as historicity, dialectic, phenomenology, and the philosophy of history. At the same time, Heidegger radically reinterpreted these concepts within the framework of ontology and the question of Being. The analysis revealed important convergences between the two philosophers in their approaches to history, modernity, and the structure of human existence. Nevertheless, Heidegger's later thought introduced a decisive reorientation through concepts such as "having been" (*Gewesenheit*), "sending" (*Geschick*), and the "forgetting of Being." Through these notions, Heidegger sought to move beyond the metaphysical tradition that he believed reached its culmination in Hegel. Heidegger's critique of Hegel is especially significant in relation to the origin and completion of metaphysics. While Hegel remained within the framework of Western metaphysics, Heidegger attempted to uncover its hidden foundations and transcend its limits. By re-reading the history of philosophy through the lens of Being, Heidegger opened a new path for philosophical inquiry, one that not only challenges modernity but also

rethinks the meaning of history and existence themselves. For this reason, Heidegger should be understood neither as a simple continuation of Hegel nor as a complete break from him. Rather, he stands in a deeply ambivalent relationship to Hegelian philosophy: profoundly indebted to it, yet constantly striving to overcome it. Finally, Heidegger's critique of modernity acquires particular significance when placed alongside the Being-centered tradition of Islamic philosophy. Such a comparison offers valuable resources for societies seeking to confront modernity critically without either uncritically imitating the West or retreating into traditionalism. In this respect, Heidegger's engagement with metaphysics may provide new conceptual possibilities for the contemporary rethinking of Islamic philosophical traditions and their encounter with the modern world.

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