



What Is the Mind and Its Relation to the Soul in Mulla Sadra's Perspective¹

Armin Mansouri²

Abstract

There is still no clear and consistent understanding of how the nature of the mind is explained within Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. On the one hand, Mulla Sadra develops a distinctive theory of the soul; on the other hand, he presents an account of the mind that differs considerably from many earlier philosophical traditions. This article reconstructs and clarifies his view of the mind through the broader framework of Sadrian philosophy. By comparing his principles concerning the soul and its functions with his analysis of mental activity, I argue that the mind is identical with the human intellectual soul. From the standpoint of Sadrian philosophy, the intellectual soul possesses imaginal immateriality and should be distinguished from the fully rational soul. Accordingly, Mulla Sadra ultimately identifies the mind with the intellectual soul.

Keywords: Soul, Mind, Intellectual Soul, Rational Soul, Imaginal Immateriality.

1. Introduction

In recent years, questions about the mind, its nature, states, and the characteristics associated with consciousness and awareness, have received renewed attention. Much of this interest has emerged from developments in cognitive science and the rapid progress of artificial intelligence. As a result, a wide range of new discussions has appeared within the philosophy of mind and related disciplines. In this context, revisiting earlier philosophical traditions can provide important insights into contemporary debates about

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² . Assistant Professor, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran, (mansouri.a1373@gmail.com).



the mind. This is especially true for intellectual traditions outside the dominant Western canon, many of which have received limited attention or have been interpreted only superficially. One significant example is the philosophy of Mulla Sadra. My research suggests that Mulla Sadra's understanding of the mind and its nature has not been studied extensively in contemporary scholarship. Even where it has been discussed, interpretations often fail to reflect the internal coherence of the Sadrian philosophical system. At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the concept of the mind in Mulla Sadra's philosophy does not correspond exactly either to its treatment in other schools of Islamic philosophy or to the accounts found in thinkers such as Aristotle.

This article seeks to establish a foundation for addressing broader issues in the philosophy of mind, such as the mind–body problem, mental causation, and consciousness, through the perspective of Sadrian philosophy.

2. The Soul and Its Functions

In addition to the material and rational dimensions of reality, Mulla Sadra posits an intermediate imaginal realm (*‘ālam al-mithāl*). Through this concept, he resolves many longstanding ambiguities concerning the nature of the soul. In his view, the imaginal realm possesses a genuine degree of immateriality (*tajarrud*). Imaginal forms exhibit many of the characteristics of material objects without themselves being material. This imaginal level stands between the material world and the purely rational (*‘aqlī*) realm. It shares certain features with both. Like rational immateriality, it is free from matter; yet like the material realm, it retains properties such as extension, quantity, and dimensionality (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 9, p 18). Imaginal forms therefore constitute a level of existence that is immaterial while still displaying qualities such as quantity, shape, and other accidental properties (Tabatabai, 2013, p 491). Accordingly, Mulla Sadra understands reality as unfolding across three levels: material, imaginal, and rational. This ontological structure also applies to the human soul, which encompasses all three dimensions. He argues for the imaginal immateriality of the soul by referring to the immaterial character of the imaginative faculty (*khiyāl*) (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 3, pp 475–487). A particularly important point is that Mulla Sadra's account of the soul's rational immateriality differs fundamentally from the views of earlier philosophers. This marks a major turning point in his philosophical anthropology. In his view, rational immateriality is not an original and fully realized condition of the soul. Rather, it is attained only when the soul achieves union with immaterial

intellects (‘uqūl) and encounters them through direct intuitive presence. Only at the highest stages of perfection does the soul become fully rational in this sense. Prior to that stage, it does not yet possess complete rational immateriality (Mulla Sadra, 1987, pp 303–305, 53–54). To explain human capacities and actions, both bodily and non-bodily, Mulla Sadra develops three foundational principles. The first is the principle of existential gradation (*tashkīk al-wujūd*), according to which a single reality can exist in varying degrees of intensity and perfection. The second is the doctrine that the soul originates materially but subsists spiritually through substantial motion. Together with the first principle, this doctrine explains how the soul gradually ascends from material existence toward immateriality. The third is the affirmation of imaginal immateriality, accompanied by a distinctive reinterpretation of rational immateriality. Based on these principles, Mulla Sadra advances three major claims concerning the soul.

First, the soul possesses multiple existential degrees. Because it initially comes into existence in relation to the body, it begins at the material level, but through its existential development it ascends toward higher degrees of immateriality. All the faculties of the soul are therefore understood as different degrees and manifestations of the soul itself. Despite its unity, the soul is identical with all of its faculties (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 3, p 221). In perception, for example, the soul becomes identical with the faculty it exercises: when it sees, it is sight; when it hears, it is hearing; and so forth (Mulla Sadra, 1996, p 292). The soul is thus a unified and dynamic reality manifesting itself across all levels of existence, from the material to the imaginal and ultimately the rational.

Second, Mulla Sadra argues that the faculties involved in particular and sensory cognition belong to the imaginal level of immateriality. These faculties, shared by humans and animals alike, include common sense, imagination (*khiyāl*), estimation (*wahm*), and memory or retention. Although bodily organs and neural structures provide the necessary conditions for their operation, the faculties themselves are not reducible to physical processes.

Third, Mulla Sadra distinguishes between the imaginal and rational levels of the soul. His analysis suggests that what is commonly called the intellective soul (*nafs nāṭiqah*), before reaching complete rational realization, actually belongs to the imaginal level of immateriality. Only in exceptional cases does the soul attain the higher stage of rational immateriality characterized by direct union with immaterial intellects. Although every human soul

possesses the potential for such perfection, very few fully actualize it (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 8, p 283).

On this basis, even universal cognition (ta‘aqqul) acquires a more nuanced meaning. Genuine perception of universals consists in the direct presence of immaterial universal realities, a capacity belonging only to the fully rational soul. By contrast, the ordinary human understanding of universals, namely, the grasping of universal concepts through reflection and reasoning, takes place at the level of the imaginal or intellective soul (Mulla Sadra, 1987, p 338). Such cognition remains mediated and indirect, resembling distant observation rather than immediate presence. This corresponds to what ordinary human understanding typically regards as universal knowledge (Obudiyyat, 2016, vol. 3, pp 125–128).

The functions of the soul can likewise be understood in terms of its different faculties and levels. Some functions belong primarily to cognition, such as thinking, perceiving universals, forming judgments, sensory awareness, and emotional experience. Others relate to motivation and volition. At the same time, from the standpoint of Sadrian philosophy, it is unnecessary to prove separately that each of these functions belongs to the soul. All human activities, whether cognitive, emotional, sensory, or volitional, are ultimately rooted in the soul itself. This includes reasoning, perception, emotional states such as anger, love, and hatred, as well as doubt, affirmation, denial, desire, imagination, and belief. Whether bodily organs participate directly in these processes or not, their ultimate ground remains the soul. For this reason, the classification of the soul’s functions in this discussion is undertaken primarily from an ontological perspective. The purpose is not to demonstrate that these activities belong to the soul, but rather to determine the level of the soul to which each activity properly belongs.

2.1. Functions of the Soul

2.1.1. Transconceptual Cognition

This type of cognition refers to a level of awareness that transcends conceptual and discursive thought. It belongs to the rational level of the soul, that is, the fully actualized rational soul, through which immaterial intellects (‘uqūl) become immediately present to the soul. Such cognition is direct, intuitive, and non-discursive. It represents one of the highest and most refined modes of human existence. Since this level lies beyond ordinary human cognition and falls outside the primary focus of this study, it will not be discussed further here.

2.1.2. Universal Conceptual Cognition

The perception of universal concepts, whether primary or secondary, is one of the defining characteristics of human beings and distinguishes them fundamentally from animals. In Mulla Sadra's framework, this capacity arises from the level of imaginal immateriality proper to the human intellectual soul. All forms of discursive thought belong to this category. Reasoning, judgment, belief formation, decision-making, and the apprehension of universal meanings are all functions of the intellectual soul. These activities do not originate from the fully rational soul in its highest and perfected sense, but rather from what Mulla Sadra calls the intellectual soul (*nafs nāṭiqah*), a level of the soul situated within imaginal immateriality while retaining the power of conceptual abstraction.

2.1.3. Sensory Cognition

Sensory cognition consists of particular perceptions acquired through the bodily organs and the five external senses. These perceptions arise through contact with external material objects and are received by the soul at its animal level. Although such perceptions depend on bodily organs, they are not themselves material. Rather, they possess imaginal immateriality. As Mulla Sadra explains, the sensory organs and neural processes merely prepare the conditions for perception; they do not constitute perception itself. In other words, the transmission of sensory information through the nervous system and its registration in the brain should not be confused with perception proper. These processes only provide the necessary preparation. Genuine perception occurs when the soul, through its imaginal faculty (*khiyāl*), produces and actualizes the corresponding perceptual form within itself. At the moment when this form comes into existence in the soul, perception is fully realized (Mulla Sadra, 1987, pp 42–43). Accordingly, all forms perceived through the senses are both particular and imaginably immaterial, even though they are mediated through physical instruments (Ashtiani, 2002, p 227).

2.1.4. Mood-Emotional (Psychological) Functions

Mood-emotional functions include a wide range of human states and dispositions, such as anger, jealousy, humility, arrogance, fear, courage, love, hatred, joy, sadness, desire, and similar experiences. To understand these functions properly, two dimensions must be distinguished. The first concerns the ontological status of these states within the soul, how they come into being. The second concerns the way the soul becomes aware of them through immediate, presence-based awareness.

With respect to the first dimension, these psychological states arise through the activity of four principal faculties: the appetitive faculty, the irascible faculty, the imaginal faculties (imagination and estimation), and the intellective faculty. Each faculty acts according to its own nature in response both to external conditions and to the internal structure of the individual. When a faculty acts in accordance with its natural inclination, it gives rise to pleasure; when it acts contrary to that inclination, it results in pain. Since each faculty naturally seeks its own fulfillment, tensions and conflicts inevitably emerge, either within a single faculty or among several faculties. These tensions generate the diverse psychological states experienced by the soul (Naraqī, 2006, p 33). Some states arise primarily from one faculty alone, for example, greed or contentment from the appetitive faculty, or fear from the irascible faculty. Other states, such as envy or arrogance, emerge through the interaction of several faculties (Naraqī, 2006, p 41).

From an ontological perspective, all of these states belong to the level of imaginal immateriality. The appetitive and irascible faculties pertain to the animal dimension of imaginal immateriality, while imagination and intellect belong to the human dimension of imaginal immateriality. Consequently, despite their differences in complexity and origin, all psychological states ultimately belong to the imaginal level of the soul, that is, to the level of the intellective soul.

Regarding the second dimension, Mulla Sadra maintains a fundamental principle: the existence of a psychological state in the soul is identical with the soul's awareness of that state. In other words, to possess such a state is simultaneously to perceive it (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 1, p 114). These states do not enter the soul from outside. Rather, they are generated by the soul itself. External events may function as triggers or occasions, but the actual realization of these states occurs within the soul. More precisely, at their own level of existence, these states are not separate from the soul but are identical with it in a particular mode. The coming-into-being of a psychological state is therefore inseparable from the soul's immediate and presence-based awareness of it. The soul does not first possess a state and then perceive it; the state and its awareness emerge together as a single unified reality.

3. The Mind and Its Functions

Most of Mulla Sadra's foundational discussions concerning the nature of the mind can best be approached through his treatment of mental existence (*al-wujūd al-dhihnī*). In his view, mental existence belongs to the level of imaginal immateriality. In other words, both what exists in the mind and the

mind itself possess a mode of being situated within the imaginal realm (Mulla Sadra, 1987, pp. 41–42). Within this context, Mulla Sadra formulates an important principle that addresses many classical objections concerning mental existence. According to this principle, the intellective soul should not be regarded as a passive container in which imaginal forms, especially the partial forms derived from sensory experience, are stored. Rather, these forms, which possess mental existence and imaginal manifestation, are actively emanated or disclosed by the intellective soul within the sphere of its own existence. The soul is therefore not the receptacle of such forms, but their source and manifester (Mulla Sadra, 1987, pp 42–44; 1981, vol. 1, p 263).

In several passages, Mulla Sadra defines the mind as the soul's capacity or preparedness to acquire perceptions that it does not yet actually possess. This definition includes all forms of cognition: those mediated through bodily organs, those arising through internal and external faculties, and those produced through thought itself. In this way, the definition encompasses both sensory and imaginal perceptions as well as conceptual universals and intellectual activity (Mulla Sadra, 1983, pp 137–138; 1981, vol. 3, p 515). Elsewhere, however, Mulla Sadra goes further and explicitly identifies the mind with the soul itself. This marks a significant departure from many earlier philosophical accounts and depends upon a subtle distinction between *mental existence* and *existence in the mind*. Not everything present in the mind possesses merely mental existence in opposition to external reality. Human qualities such as courage or strength, for example, exist in the mind while also possessing genuine objective reality. On this basis, Mulla Sadra states that the soul is the mind, and that both the mind and its attributes possess real and objective existence (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 4, p 251). This claim carries two important implications. First, it directly affirms the identity of the mind and the soul. Second, it extends the characteristics of the soul to the mind, treating both the mind and its properties as real and objective rather than merely conceptual or representational. In this sense, the mind and its accidents are identical with the soul and its accidents. The mind is therefore not a separate entity or merely an inner domain detached from reality, but an objective and externally real substance. In short, there is a single unified reality that is sometimes described as the "soul" and at other times as the "mind." This interpretation is reinforced by later commentators within the Sadrian tradition. Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, for example, explicitly identifies the mind with the intellective soul and even speaks of different levels of the

mind, treating what exists in the mind as levels or manifestations of the soul itself (Sabzevari, 1990, vol. 2, p 150). Likewise, ‘Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji describes the mind as an external substance whose function is to perceive the forms of things, thereby equating it with the intellective soul (Lahiji, n.d., vol. 1, p. 51). It is important to emphasize, however, that these interpretations do not equate the mind with the soul in its absolute and unrestricted sense. Rather, they identify the mind specifically with the intellective level of the human soul. In this way, the scope and nature of the mind become both clarified and properly delimited.

3.1. Functions of the Mind

A careful examination of the functions attributed to the mind provides an important pathway for understanding its quiddity. In addition to the explicit definitions found in Mulla Sadra’s writings, it is necessary to identify and analyze all the functions that are either directly assigned to the mind or implicitly presuppose its activity.

3.1.1. Sensory Perception

The first function of the mind arises from its primary definition as the soul’s capacity to acquire perceptions that it does not yet possess. On this basis, all forms of knowledge obtained through the external senses are attributed to the mind. Every mental form derived from sight, hearing, smell, taste, or touch is perceived by the mind. At the same time, the external senses alone cannot complete the process of perception. Internal faculties such as common sense, imagination (*khiyāl*), and estimation (*wahm*) process, organize, and unify sensory data, thereby making perception possible. For this reason, the perceptions generated through these internal faculties are also attributed to the mind. This attribution rests on two considerations. First, such perceptions belong to the category of acquired knowledge, that is, knowledge the soul does not initially possess but gradually acquires. Second, these faculties generate perceptual forms that are explicitly described as mental forms and are therefore understood to possess mental existence. Even though, in Mulla Sadra’s epistemology, acquired knowledge ultimately returns to presential knowledge because of the soul’s creative activity, it is still considered “acquired” insofar as it originates through engagement with external objects. Consequently, all particular and imaginal perceptions, whether mediated by the external senses or internally generated, such as the imagination of fictional beings, belong to the functions of the mind. Likewise, meanings grasped through the estimative faculty, such as perceiving beauty in a visual scene, also fall within the domain of mental perception.

4. Conceptual Cognition and Thought Processes

Mulla Sadra also attributes the perception of conceptual universals to the mind, an attribution already present in Avicennan philosophy, where such acts were classified as rational cognition. Within the Sadrian framework, however, this idea is reinterpreted through the doctrine of mental existence. According to Mulla Sadra, universals exist in the mind through a weak intuition or attenuated presence of immaterial intellects. He describes this as a kind of "distant intuition." The universal form realized within the soul is therefore only a faint and indeterminate manifestation of a fully immaterial rational essence. This limitation results from the soul's existential weakness and its distance from the higher realm of immaterial intellects (Mulla Sadra, 1987, pp 53–54). /Accordingly, the universals perceived by the mind are not the immaterial intellects themselves, but conceptual universals, forms that appear universal because of their abstraction and indeterminacy. These include both primary intelligibles and secondary logical or philosophical intelligibles. In Sadrian philosophy, the apprehension of all such concepts is explicitly regarded as a function of the mind. Mulla Sadra likewise attributes the process of thinking, understood as the movement from premises to conclusions, to the mind (Mulla Sadra, 1984, p 61). This attribution is further reinforced by his treatment of logical secondary intelligibles, whose apprehension necessarily presupposes mental activity. On this basis, decision-making processes that give rise to human action may also be attributed to the mind. Human action depends upon the evaluation and organization of acquired concepts and perceptions, and since these activities belong to the sphere of intellectual operations, their connection to the mind is both direct and essential. Up to this point, it becomes evident that all the functions traditionally attributed to the mind by earlier philosophers, especially those connected to acquired knowledge, forms, meanings, and concepts, are likewise affirmed within the Sadrian framework. Yet a deeper engagement with Mulla Sadra's system reveals additional dimensions of the mind that distinguish his view from those of his predecessors.

5. Mood-Emotional (Psychological) Functions

Mood-emotional functions refer to states associated with moral qualities, emotions, and affective intensities, such as fear, love, jealousy, courage, and similar conditions that human beings consciously experience along with their qualitative, and sometimes even quantitative, dimensions. If, within Mulla Sadra's philosophical framework, these states can be shown to belong to the mind, then together with the previously discussed functions it follows that

all human perceptions, properties, and experiences are attributable to the mind. To establish this connection, it is first necessary to clarify the relation between the mind and presential (intuitive) knowledge that form of awareness through which human beings directly experience their own states. A foundational principle in Sadrian philosophy is that existence is inseparable from presence and perception. In other words, cognition is identical with existence itself. Nothing can exist without being present, in some manner, to a perceiver capable of awareness. Wherever there is existence, there is also perception, whether in the form of self-awareness or the awareness of something other than oneself. Moreover, a being capable of perceiving its own essence is also capable of perceiving other things (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 1, p 114).

When combined with the creative power attributed to the mind in the doctrine of mental existence, this principle establishes that the mind possesses presential awareness of its own contents. The mind does not passively receive forms from the external world; rather, it actively produces or manifests them within itself. Since these forms are brought into existence by the mind itself, their perception cannot be merely representational or acquired in the Peripatetic sense, but must instead be immediate and presential (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 4, pp 264–266; 1982, pp 25–26). This follows from a broader metaphysical principle: the effect is not wholly separate from its cause, but depends entirely upon it and remains present to it. As Allameh Tabatabai explains, the effect has no independent existence apart from its cause and is therefore fully present to it (Tabatabai, 2013, p 399). Consequently, the mind perceives its own productions in the same immediate manner through which it perceives itself. From this perspective, what is traditionally called “acquired knowledge” is ultimately reducible to presential knowledge. Mental forms and concepts may still be described as “acquired” because they refer to external objects, yet their actual existence within the mind is presential, since they are generated by the mind itself. Their perception is therefore direct rather than mediated (Mesbah-Yazdi, 1987, vol. 1, p 155). On this basis, the mind, which possesses the power to generate forms, meanings, and concepts, must also possess the capacity to generate and manifest its own states and properties. These properties are not external additions to the mind; rather, they are manifestations of the mind itself. According to Sadrian philosophy, they exist within the mind and are identical with it at their own level of existence (Sabzevari, 1990, vol. 2, p 150). It therefore follows that the mind’s awareness of these states is

necessarily presential. Mulla Sadra expresses this point explicitly: "The power and courage found in a courageous or powerful person are properties of the soul; and since the soul is identical with the mind, these properties are also properties of the mind. Their existence in the mind does not mean merely mental or representational existence, but rather genuine, objective existence. Thus, when such properties exist in the mind, they exist there with real existence" (Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 4, p 251). Genuine existence is inseparable from presence and awareness. The stronger and more intense a mode of existence becomes, the more vivid and complete its corresponding awareness. Thus, when qualities such as courage or power are said to possess real existence within the mind, this implies that they are both objectively real and consciously present.

Furthermore, in Sadrian metaphysics, the properties and accidents of a thing are manifestations of that thing itself. The mind therefore not only generates forms and concepts but also manifests its own states and qualities as real modes of its being. Since these properties genuinely exist, they must also be present to the mind. Within this framework, it would be incoherent for such properties to exist in the mind without being consciously experienced by it. Strictly speaking, however, such extended argumentation is not even necessary. In the same passage, Mulla Sadra explicitly identifies the soul with the mind and states that the properties of the soul are likewise the properties of the mind. This direct identification already implies the conclusions demonstrated above through philosophical reconstruction.

Accordingly, the mind generates its own states and possesses presential awareness of them. Emotional and moral experiences, such as fear, love, jealousy, arrogance, courage, and similar conditions, arise within the mind and are immediately perceived by it. More precisely, the mind experiences itself as existing in these states. From a deeper Sadrian perspective, these properties are not merely located in the mind; they are identical with the mind at a certain level. They are simply the mind manifesting itself in different modes. This relation can also be explained in another way. As noted earlier, moral and emotional states arise from the activity of four principal faculties: the appetitive faculty, the irascible faculty, the imaginal faculties (imagination and estimation), and the intellective faculty in the sense of conceptual cognition. These faculties generate the various moral characteristics found in human beings. Since such states originate from them, the soul, at the level of these faculties, possesses presential awareness of their qualities. This follows from the principle that the coming-into-being of a

thing is identical with its presential awareness by its source. At a deeper level, however, these faculties and their states are not truly separate from the soul; rather, they are modes of its existence. The soul's awareness of these states is therefore ultimately a form of self-awareness.

Earlier it was shown that imagination, conceptual cognition, and even the appetitive and irascible faculties are attributable to the mind. It was also shown that the states arising from these faculties are properties of the mind itself. In this way, both the relation of these states to the mind and the manner in which the mind perceives them, through presential awareness, are clearly established.

Finally, on the basis of these considerations, another function of the mind may be identified: the ability to abstract and form conceptual representations from its own presential experiences. For example, when the state of jealousy is present within the mind, the mind can derive from this lived and qualitative experience a corresponding concept. Thus, when "jealousy" is later discussed, the mind refers not merely to an abstract notion, but to a concept grounded in its own prior presential awareness.

6. The Relationship Between the Soul and the Mind

If we consider Mulla Sadra's use of the concept of the mind alongside his broader analysis of the soul, a clear pattern emerges: the mind is effectively equivalent to what he calls the intellective soul (*naḥs nāṭiqah*). By "intellective soul," however, Mulla Sadra does not mean the fully actualized rational soul at its highest level. Rather, he refers to a level of the human soul characterized by imaginal immateriality, the specifically human imaginal, intellectual level that distinguishes human beings from animals while still remaining below complete rational immateriality. This identification can be established through several converging lines of evidence. First, in Sadrian philosophy, particular perceptions are carried out through faculties such as imagination (*khiyāl*) and estimation (*wahm*). Yet these faculties are not independent substances; they are simply degrees or levels of the soul itself. Such perceptions are therefore ultimately acts of the soul. At the same time, Mulla Sadra consistently attributes these very perceptions to the mind. Second, the perception of universals, understood not as direct intuition of immaterial intellects but as the grasp of conceptual universals possessing an imaginal and indeterminate character, is treated in Sadrian philosophy as an activity of the intellective soul. Yet Mulla Sadra also attributes this same function to the mind. Third, prior to attaining full rational immateriality, the intellective soul exists at the level of imaginal immateriality. The mind, as

described by Mulla Sadra, shares precisely this ontological status. Fourth, thinking (*tafakkur*) is identified by Mulla Sadra as a defining feature of the intellective soul, and this same activity is explicitly attributed to the mind. Fifth, because the soul is a unified yet graded reality that manifests across multiple levels, both particular and universal perceptions are ultimately acts of the soul. Correspondingly, both forms of perception are attributed to the mind, further reinforcing their equivalence. Finally, and most decisively, Mulla Sadra explicitly identifies the mind with the soul. He attributes all human qualities, including power, courage, and other psychological and moral traits, to the mind, even though such qualities are traditionally regarded as properties of the soul. He further insists that these properties, together with the mind itself, possess genuine and objective existence. This leads directly to the conclusion that what is called the "mind" is nothing other than the soul considered under a particular description.

On the basis of these considerations, it becomes evident that in Sadrian philosophy the mind is identical with the soul. Yet this identity must be specified more precisely: at what level of the soul does this equivalence hold? Drawing on Mulla Sadra's three central doctrines, (1) the imaginal immateriality of the intellective soul, (2) the imaginal immateriality of both particular perceptions and conceptual universal cognition, and (3) the unity of the soul across its degrees, it becomes clear that the mind corresponds specifically to the intellective level of the soul. In other words, the "mind" refers to that level of the human soul which:

- is shared by all human beings,
- operates within the domain of imaginal immateriality, and
- has not yet attained the highest stage of rational immateriality.

Thus, the intellective soul, situated at the human imaginal-intellectual level, can appropriately be identified as the mind.

7. Conclusion

This article examined three fundamental aspects of Mulla Sadra's theory of the soul. First, all the faculties of the soul are understood as degrees or levels of the soul itself; despite its unity, the soul is identical with each of these faculties. Second, Mulla Sadra places nearly all human functions, except those belonging specifically to the fully actualized rational soul, within the domain of imaginal immateriality. Third, what ordinary human beings possess, namely the intellective soul prior to the full realization of rational immateriality, exists precisely at this imaginal level. On the basis of these principles, the article analyzed the various contexts in which Mulla Sadra

employs the concept of the mind throughout his works. By comparing the functions attributed to the mind with those attributed to the intellectual soul at the level of imaginal immateriality, it becomes evident that, within the Sadrian framework, the mind is identical with this level of the soul. In other words, the mind in Mulla Sadra's philosophy is not a separate faculty, nor is it limited merely to conceptual cognition. Rather, it is the very reality from which nearly all human functions, cognitive, perceptual, emotional, and volitional, emerge, except for those belonging exclusively to the highest stage of rational immateriality. In this respect, the mind fulfills essentially the same role traditionally assigned to the soul.

This interpretation marks a significant departure from many earlier philosophical accounts in which the mind was treated primarily as a restricted faculty concerned with conceptual knowledge and mental representation. By contrast, Mulla Sadra advances a far more comprehensive and ontologically grounded conception, identifying the mind with the intellectual soul itself at the level of imaginal immateriality.

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