سوزان هاک و نظریه دورگه توجیه معرفتی

نویسنده
مرتضی فتحی زاده
دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران
چکیده
نظریه فاندهرنتیسم (مبنا-انسجام­گرایی) سوزان هاک، فیلسوف بریتانیایی-آمریکایی، کوششی نوآورانه در معرفت‌شناسی معاصر است که می­خوهد از دوگانه­های سنتی مانند مبناگرایی - انسجام‌گرایی، علل – دلایل و برون­گرایی – درون­گرایی فراتر رود. هاک به­جای فروکاستن توجیه به باورهای پایه خطاناپذیر یا به انسجام صرف باورها، الگوی جایگزینی پیشنهاد می‌کند که در آن توجیه معرفتی حاصل تعامل و هم‌افزایی شواهد تجربی، باورهای پیشین و میزان انسجام کل شبکه باورهاست. او مدعی است با بهره­گیری از ویژگی­های مثبت دو نظریه سنتی و به دور از کاستی­های آنها ساختاری پویا و تدریجی برای توجیه ترسیم می‌کند که امکان تصحیح و بازنگری باورها را فراهم می‌سازد. با این­همه، فاندهرنتیسم با چالش­هایی همچون تردید در اصالت و استقلال، ناکامی در تبیین گذار از شواهد غیر-مفهومی به توجیه معرفتی، و ابهام در مدعای حقیقت‌نمایی آن روبه­روست. این جستار با رویکردی تحلیلی و انتقادی به تبیین مؤلفه‌های اصلی فاندهرنتیسم و ارزیابی مهم‌ترین خرده‌گیری‌های وارد بر آن می‌پردازد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
فاندهرنتیسم (مبنا- انسجام گرایی)
توجیه معرفتی
حقیقت‌نمایی
فراتوجیه
سوزان هاک

عنوان مقاله English

Susan Haack and the Double-Aspect Theory of Epistemic Justification

نویسنده English

Morteza Fathizadeh
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

Susan Haack’s theory of foundherentism represents an innovative attempt in contemporary epistemology to move beyond entrenched dichotomies such as foundationalism versus coherentism, reasons versus causes, and externalism versus internalism. By rejecting the reduction of epistemic justification either to infallible basic beliefs or to mere coherence among beliefs, Haack proposes an alternative model in which justification emerges from the interaction and mutual reinforcement of experiential evidence, prior beliefs, and the overall coherence of a belief system. She argues that, by drawing on the strengths of both traditional theories while avoiding their shortcomings, foundherentism offers a dynamic and gradual structure of epistemic justification that allows for the correction and revision of beliefs. Nevertheless, the theory has faced several criticisms, including doubts about its originality and theoretical independence, its inability to adequately explain the transition from non-conceptual evidence to epistemic justification, and ambiguities surrounding its claim to truth-indicativeness.
This paper adopts an analytic and critical approach to explicating the main components of foundherentism and assessing the most significant objections raised against it.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Foundherentism
Epistemic Justification
Truth-Indicativeness
Ratification
Susan Haack
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